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The Dawn of Cosmopolitan Denizenship
ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG °

A major conclusion of Linda Bosniak's careful review of contemporary
trends and arguments is that, while citizenship as we know it is still firmly
anchored in the nation-State, this is no longer the whole story.'
Acknowledging that it is imprudent to exaggerate the extent to which specific
regional developments such as the emergence ofa quasi-European citizenship
deviate from the mold, since the European status is conditional upon discrete
national membership, Bosniak insists that it is also misguided to willfully ignore
an array of contemporary developments moving the realities of citizenship
beyond the traditional conception. Something worth paying attention to is
definitely going on, but what, precisely, does it amount to?
While largely agreeing with Bosniak's overall stance and most of the
particulars of her analysis, I believe that more can be done to "denaturalize"
the citizenship and nation-State linkage by examining its historical matrix and
considering to what extent the conditions that spawned it have changed in the
intervening period. Ofcourse, a change in conditions does not of itself warrant
relinquishing an important institution; but a consideration ofthe altered context
is likely to elucidate the institution's limitations and hence contribute to a more
informed consideration of possible modifications and alternatives.
What I bluntly term "the hypernationalist version of citizenship" is a
relatively recent institution, formed largely in response to tensions induced by
distinct, but interactive, processes around the turn of the twentieth century.
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These processes included, on the one hand, escalating international politicoeconomic rivalries and, on the other hand, a vast expansion of international
migrations from poor to rich countries. Initially originating in a handful of
leading countries, hypernationalist citizenship quickly spread among their
epigones. Ironically, it is still taking hold de novo in some parts of the world
today, notably new States arising out ofdecolonization and the dismantling of
empires, even as it is becoming relativized among the countries where it arose
in the first place.
In retrospect, one can only wonder at the strangeness of a historical
trajectory whereby most of the population of the world's richest and most
powerful countries, encompassing tens and eventually hundreds of millions of
individuals, came to believe that they constituted mutually exclusive "natural"
communities sharing a hallowed ancestry and destined in the divine scheme of
things to share a common fate. Fostered to some extent by the greater
development of social communications within, as opposed to across,
international borders in the course of modernization, these beliefs were
deliberately stimulated in the latter part ofthe nineteenth century by elaborate
public policies specifically designed to promote national distinctiveness and
solidarity. I Among them, undoubtedly the most widespread and effective, was
the elaboration by State-serving intellectuals of national histories, following
(more or less explicitly) the model set forth for France by Ernest Renan, and
the incorporation of the beliefs into each State's system of mass elementary
education, along with the teaching of the country's official language.
The internalization of such nationalized cultures provided the underpinnings
for widespread acceptance of a conceptualization of citizenship grounded in
a global system of mutually exclusive State jurisdictions and concomitant
national loyalties. The formalization of citizenship was itself rendered more
urgent during this period by incipient democratization (which entailed its
extension to the male populace as a whole), and by the expansion of the
infrastructural power of the State (which entailed the regulation of individual
comportment in hitherto ignored spheres of social existence). Although the
expansion ofcitizenship had taken place much earlier in the two revolutionary
nation-States, France and the United States, the incorporation of hitherto
excluded groups and the mobilization of the masses required formalization
there as well.

1. KARL W. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION:
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The institutionalization of citizenship in this form was a major aspect of
"nationalization of rights," which Hannah Arendt identified as a key element
in the development of totalitarianism. Writing in the wake of the horrors of
World War II, she emphasized the secular drift, as a concomitant of the
formation of nation-States, of the traditional Western doctrine of human rights
toward that of nationally guaranteed rights. Implied in the dynamics of the
Westphalian international system of States from the very outset was the idea
"that only nationals could be citizens, only people of the same national origin
could enjoy the full protection of legal institutions, that persons of different
nationality needed some law of exception until or unless they were completely
assimilated and divorced from their origin."' Although Rogers Brubaker
subsequently distinguished between States that adhere to an "ethnic"
conception of nationality, reflected in adherence tojus sanguinis,as against
a "civic" conception, expressed in jus soli (using Germany and France as
respective archetypes), Arendt's formulation remains generally applicable:
even the German "ethnic" State provided for the possibility of naturalization,
whereas within the French "civic" State, an effective distinction arose between
the population that was "ancestrally" French and other French citizens .3 Even
in the United States, concern over the "new immigration" in the late nineteenth
century led to the introduction of a distinction within the census between
native-born of"native" parentage and native-born of"foreign" parentage. As
Arendt rightly emphasizes, where the possibility of citizenship was extended
to nonnationals, it required a profound personal transformation on their part,
well expressed by the term "naturalization."
Paradoxically, the concerted efforts of States to sharpen the institutional
delineation of national boundaries were prompted by proliferating
transgressions, as the spreading "great transformation" uprooted rural
populations numbering in the hundreds of millions throughout the European
periphery and many parts of Asia, while the revolutionary impact of the
railroad and the steamship brought relatively inexpensive long-distance
transportation within reach of a very large share of humanity. Even as States
eagerly took advantage of the cheap foreign labor the new international
configuration rendered available, most of the world's leading countries sought
to prevent the undesirable poor from gaining access to membership in the
receiving community and the bundle of collective goods it afforded.4 In some
2. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 275 (1973).
3. ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY (1992).

4. For an elaboration of these points, see Aristide R. Zolberg, Global Movements, Global
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cases, the workers in question were categorically excluded from citizenship,
as was the case, for example, with the Chinese imported into the United States
from 1850 to 1882. Elsewhere, the exclusion took the form of "guestworker"
programs and, in some cases (notably Britain in 1905), the solution was to
impose draconian limits on immigration altogether. In the wake of World War
I and the Russian revolution, the latter approach of severe limitations on
immigration was generalized. Viewed in the present perspective, adoption by
the United States in the 1920s of a quota system based on national origins to
allocate drastically reduced entries can be seen as an effort to restore
American nationality to the status quo ante-a blend of mostly Protestant
northwest European groups. Along with potential migrants, ordinary travelers
were also subjected to a proliferation of controls on movement that vastly
enhanced the significance ofthe national foundations of citizenship and brought
it to the awareness of anyone who might have occasion to venture even
casually to another country.5 The harnessing of the inherent challenge
immigration posed to the institutionalization ofthe hypernationalist version of
citizenship was facilitated from the 1920s onward by the emergence, in a
number of the source countries, of political and economic formations that
required these States to severely restrict exit. These included not only the
"totalitarian" regimes of Europe, but also the production-oriented colonies
under European control.
In addition, in the sphere of international law, "theoretically[,] sovereignty
is nowhere more absolute than in matters of 'emigration, naturalization,
nationality and expulsion."' 6 Although Arendt was writing with reference to
Europe, it is important to note that the observation is also applicable to the
United States, where since the beginning ofthe twentieth century, the sphere
of immigration has been exceptionally State-centric. As Peter Schuck has
pointed out:
Probably no other area ofAmerican law has been so radically
insulated and divergent from those fundamental norms of
constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role
that animate the rest of our legal system. In a legal

Walls: Responses to Migration, 1885-1925, in GLOBAL HISTORY AND MIGRATIONS 279 (Wang
Gungwu ed., 1997).

5. See JOHN

TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP, AND

THE STATE (1999).
6. ARENDT, supra note 3, at 278 (internal citation omitted).
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firmament transformed by revolutions in due process and
equal protection doctrine and by a new conception ofjudicial
role, immigration law remains the realm in which government
authority is at the zenith, and individual entitlement is at the
nadir."
Concurrently, national citizenship emerged as a pivotal element of the
awesome social contract fostered by the Westphalian system of States. In an
anarchic world, the sovereign provides not only Hobbesian security within, but
also security against preying Behemoths and Leviathans without; and in
counterpart, those under itsjurisdiction have the obligation "to submit to being
placed in harm's way when the state chooses."' Albeit clearly visible from a
consideration of political development in Europe and the United States, the
rooting of national citizenship in the dynamics of the international system of
States was ignored by T.H. Marshall, perhaps because of his insular and
exclusively sociological orientation, and neglected by most recent writers on
the subject as well. In short, the transformation of subjects into citizens was
universally coupled with the imposition of some form ofmilitary obligation upon
them-with both citizenship and military obligation being restricted to males.'
In the United States, for example, even before the revolution, militias became
"the hallmarks of full citizenship in the community."'"
Responding to the double dynamic noted, the nationalist conception of
citizenship was firmly established on both sides of the Atlantic by the 1920s.
It was subsequently reinforced by the further consolidation of international
boundaries induced by economic protectionism during the Great Depression,
the strategic rivalries of the second phase of the twentieth-century's, thirtyyear long world war (encompassing both WWI and WWII), and the East-West
confrontation that followed (the Cold War). Enhanced by bureaucratic and
judicial practices, the national conception of citizenship achieved at least the
residual hegemony, in the absence of challenges, which it still retains today.
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, it is evident that the two
processes that contributed to the hypertrophy of the nationalist element of
citizenship have undergone major alterations. Most dramatically, the
securitarian social contract that was a central feature of the political
7.
8.
9.
10.

Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1984).
Linda Kerber, The Meanings of Citizenship, 84 J. AM. HIST. 835-36 (1997).
MARGARET LEVI, CONSENT, DISSENT, AND PATRIOTISM 80-106 (1997).
Id. at 59 (quoting JOHN SHY, A PEOPLE NUMEROUS AND ARMED 29 (1976)).
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organization of modern States has been steadily minimized on both sides ofthe
Atlantic. Although Linda Kerber insists that the military obligation element of
U.S. citizenship remains real, despite the advent of the all-volunteer army in
1975, and warns that "when we consider the meanings of citizenship we ignore
it at our peril," it is difficult to imagine circumstances under which the contract
would be effectively reinstated." As the importance of this element of
citizenship was diminished, States became less insistent on exclusive
membership and adopted a more permissive stance toward multiple affiliations.
As Bosniak points out, while the proliferation of persons holding multiple
citizenship does not amount to "denationalization," it does entail a significant
departure from the traditional nationalist construction.
The situation with regard to international movement is more ambiguous.
One of the most important developments of recent decades is access to
freedom of exit by populations hitherto politically confined. This awesome
transformation, involving hundreds of millions of individuals worldwide, began
with the decolonization of Asia and Africa in the post-World War II decades,
when most of the emerging new States relinquished the prohibitions on exit
imposed by their colonial rulers on mercantilist grounds. A second phase was
inaugurated with the collapse of European communism in the late 1980s. At
the same time, the regions in question were integrated into the global economy,
forcing large numbers to relocate in search of work. Although most of the
resulting migrations took place within countries, the international component
grew as well. During the decades of the post-war economic boom, the rich
countries eagerly availed themselves of the additional supply of labor from
peripheral regions, including former colonies; but, when the boom collapsed in
the 1970s, most reacted in a protectionist manner. Subsequently, the
Europeans generally adopted a sharply restrictive and effectively enforced
stance toward the entry of nationals from poorer countries, whereas the United
States and the overseas "white dominions" maintained policies that provided
for a significant level of legal immigration. Today, the United States appears
to be moving toward a proliferation of "guestworker" programs at various
levels of skill and, in effect, it also allows a steady stream of illegal entries.
Many individuals in these categories ultimately gain access to permanent
residence. From the 1960s to the 1990s, there was also an increase in the
number of international refugees, most of whom ended up permanently
resettling in foreign countries. 2
Ii. Kerber, supra note 8, at 836.
12. For up-to-date overviews, see

GLOBAL MIGRANTS, GLOBAL REFUGEES: PROBLEMS AND

2000]

DAWN OF COSMOPOLITAN DENIZENSHIP

A carefully constructed statistical overview ofthe 1965-96 period reveals
that over these three decades worldwide migration grew at about the same
rate as population. In 1965, a little over 2 percent of residents in all countries
3
were foreign-born; this was the case as well at the end of the period.
However, the proportion of foreign-born individuals in developed countries
grew from 3.1 to 4.5 percent. The most dramatic change took place in
Western Europe, where the proportion climbed from 3.6 percent to 6.1
percent, representing a relative increase of nearly 70 percent for the period as
a whole. When this quantitative change is combined with a shift in the
immigrants' countries of origin, from largely Western Europe to a more mixed
combination that includes predominantly the eastern and southern
Mediterranean rim, it amounts to a major social transformation. North
America, over the same period, grew from 6 to 8.6 percent, a substantial, but
much less dramatic increase; in the United States, this increase involved a shift
in source countries from North America (Mexico and Canada) and Europe to
Latin America (Mexico, Central and South America), the Caribbean, and Asia.
Despite profound initial variations in the extent to which immigrants and
their descendants had access to citizenship of the receiving countries, over
time there has been a general convergence toward full incorporation.
Accordingly, most of the receivers now have (or will soon acquire) an
unprecedented proportion of citizens who are ofnonnational origin. Although
the proportion in the United States is well below the record level of the early
part of the twentieth century, it is higher than it has been since the end of
World War II. In combination with the more permissive stance toward
multiple membership noted earlier, and the maintenance of effective ties with
countries oforigin (rendered possible by the revolution in communication and
transportation), this development has effectively diluted the nationalist core of
conventional citizenship. While at the formal level citizenship remains linked
with the nation-State, subjectively and in practice it has become, for many, a
more contingent and circumscribed affiliation, leaving room for other
significant forms of membership.
Finally, while it is literally correct to argue that in the absence of institutions
of governance, the proliferation of elements of international civil society does
not amount to the emergence of "postnational citizenship," there is no denying
that these elements have come into being as a result of a spreading awareness
SOLUTIONS (Aristide R. Zolberg & Peter Benda eds., forthcoming 2000).
13. Hania Zlotnik, International Migration 1965-96: An Overview,
DEV. REv. 429 (1998).

24 POPULATION AND
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among many national citizens oftheir concurrent membership in a single global
species, and that in turn the visibility of these elements in the world at large has
a feedback effect on the growth of cosmopolitanism. Paralleling the
development of national consciousness in an earlier era, this emerging
realization is fostered in part by processes of social communication, which are
now increasingly global in scope. A contributing factor to this realization is the
vast expansion of international travel for business and pleasure, which now
constitutes one of the leading worldwide industries (ironically, even while
erecting barriers to immigration, most countries are very eager to minimize
barriers to such movements), and the reduction of obstacles in turn fosters the
domestication of international travel. Beyond this, segments ofthe public are
also motivated by the practical understanding that some of the most serious
threats to human survival cannot be dealt with by a single State acting alone,
but require global cooperation.
Altogether, these developments make for a profound disparity between the
residual hard-edged national conception of citizenship and a growing, albeit
diffuse, sense of cosmopolitan membership. However, the diffuse character
of the latter makes it no less real; in retrospect, there was a time when
nationalmembership was equally diffuse-as in Shakespeare's England, or
revolutionary France, or in Nigeria today. In effect, more nationals see the
globe as a second home and believe that this involves both certain rights and
certain obligations. For the tough-minded, "citizenship" at that level cannot be
achieved in the absence ofglobal political institutions. But something else can,
and it is beginning to be. In many traditions, strangers who were useful longterm residents of a community acquired the status of "denizens," which
conferred upon them many rights except that of political participation. That is
perhaps where we find ourselves today-at the dawn of "cosmopolitan
denizenship."

